Classics in game theory /
In the last fifteen years, game theory has become the dominant model in economic theory and has made significant contributions to political science, biology, and international security studies. The central role of game theory in economic theory was recognized by the awarding of the Nobel Memorial Pr...
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| フォーマット: | Licensed eBooks |
| 言語: | 英語 |
| 出版事項: |
Princeton, N.J. :
Princeton University Press
c1997.
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| シリーズ: | Frontiers of economic research.
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| オンライン･アクセス: | https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/j.ctv173f1fh |
目次:
- Equilibrium points in n-person games ; The bargaining problem / John F. Nash, Jr.
- Non-cooperative games / John Nash
- An iterative method of solving a game / Julia Robinson
- Equivalence of games in extensive form / F.B. Thompson
- Extensive games and the problem of information / H.W. Kuhn
- A value for n-person games ; Stochastic games / L.S. Shapley
- Recursive games / H. Everett
- Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions to cooperative games without side payments / R.J. Aumann and B. Peleg
- A limit theorem on the core of an economy / Gerard Debreu and Herbert Scarf
- The bargaining set for cooperative games / Robert J. Aumann and Michael Maschler
- Existence of competitive equilibria in markets with a continuum of traders / Robert J. Aumann
- The core of an n-person game / Herbert E. Scarf
- Games with incomplete information played by "Bayesian" players. pt. 1. The basic model ; pt. 2. Bayesian equilibrium points ; pt. 3. The basic probability distribution of the game / John C. Harsanyi
- The big match / David Blackwell and T.S. Ferguson
- On market games / Lloyd S. Shapley and Martin Shubik
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games / R. Selten.