Political leadership and collective goods /
Using the assumptions of rationality and self-interest common to economic analysis, Professors Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and Young develop a profit-making theory of political behavior as it pertains to the supply of collective goods-defense, law and order, clean air, highways.Originally published in 19...
| Autors principals: | , , |
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| Format: | Licensed eBooks |
| Idioma: | anglès |
| Publicat: |
Princeton, New Jersey :
Princeton University Press
1971.
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| Col·lecció: | Princeton legacy library.
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| Accés en línia: | https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/j.ctt13x19bj |
Taula de continguts:
- Frontmatter
- Foreword
- Preface
- Contents
- Introduction
- CHAPTER ONE. Noncompetitive Politics
- CHAPTER TWO. The Consequences of Noncompetitive Politics
- CHAPTER THREE. Competitive Politics
- CHAPTER FOUR. Some Consequences of Political Competition
- CHAPTER FIVE. Strategic Interaction
- CHAPTER SIX. Conclusion
- APPENDIX 1. The Size of Groups
- APPENDIX 2. Table of Symbols
- APPENDIX 3. Table of Equations
- Index