A mere machine : the Supreme Court, Congress, and American democracy /
In this work, the author reports evidence showing that the Supreme Court is in fact extraordinarily deferential to congressional preferences in its constitutional rulings.
| Autore principale: | |
|---|---|
| Natura: | Licensed eBooks |
| Lingua: | inglese |
| Pubblicazione: |
New Haven :
Yale University Press
[2013]
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| Accesso online: | https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/j.ctt5vkwk1 |
Sommario:
- The Supreme Court, Congress, and American democracy
- The Supreme Court, the elected branches, and the Constitution
- Estimating the effect of elected branch preferences on Supreme Court judgments
- The puzzle of the two Rehnquist courts
- Explaining the puzzle of the two Rehnquist courts
- Elected branch preferences, public opinion, or socioeconomic trends?
- Restoring the Court's missing docket
- Misreading the Roberts court
- What's so great about independent courts, anyway?