The political logic of economic reform in China /
| Hoofdauteur: | |
|---|---|
| Formaat: | Licensed eBooks |
| Taal: | Engels |
| Gepubliceerd in: |
Berkeley :
University of California Press
©1993.
|
| Reeks: | California series on social choice and political economy ;
24. |
| Online toegang: | https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/jj.2711534 |
Inhoudsopgave:
- Formal Authority Relations Among Central Communist Party and Government Institutions in the People's Republic of China
- pt. 1. Introduction. 1. The Political Logic of Economic Reform. 2. The Prereform Chinese Economy and the Decision to Initiate Market Reforms
- pt. 2. Chinese Political Institutions. 3. Authority Relations: The Communist Party and the Government. 4. Leadership Incentives: Political Succession and Reciprocal Accountability. 5. Bargaining Arena: The Government Bureaucracy. 6. Who Is Enfranchised in the Policy-making Process? 7. Decision Rules: Delegation by Consensus. 8. Chinese Political Institutions and the Path of Economic Reforms
- pt. 3. Economic Reform Policy-Making. 9. Playing to the Provinces: Fiscal Decentralization and the Politics of Reform. 10. Creating Vested Interests in Reform: Industrial Reform Takeoff, 1978-81. 11. Leadership Succession and Policy Conflict: The Choice Between Profit Contracting and Substituting Tax-for-Profit, 1982-83. 12. Building Bureaucratic Consensus: Formulating the Tax-for-Profit Policy, 1983-84. 13. The Power of Particularism: Abortive Price Reform and the Revival of Profit Contracting, 1985-88
- pt. 4. Conclusion. 14. The Political Lessons of Economic Reform in China.