Political leadership and collective goods /

Using the assumptions of rationality and self-interest common to economic analysis, Professors Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and Young develop a profit-making theory of political behavior as it pertains to the supply of collective goods-defense, law and order, clean air, highways.Originally published in 19...

Deskribapen osoa

Xehetasun bibliografikoak
Egile Nagusiak: Frohlich, Norman (Egilea), Oppenheimer, Joe A. (Egilea), Young, Oran R. (Egilea)
Formatua: Licensed eBooks
Hizkuntza:ingelesa
Argitaratua: Princeton, New Jersey : Princeton University Press, 1971.
Saila:Princeton legacy library.
Sarrera elektronikoa:https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=947105
Aurkibidea:
  • Frontmatter
  • Foreword
  • Preface
  • Contents
  • Introduction
  • CHAPTER ONE. Noncompetitive Politics
  • CHAPTER TWO. The Consequences of Noncompetitive Politics
  • CHAPTER THREE. Competitive Politics
  • CHAPTER FOUR. Some Consequences of Political Competition
  • CHAPTER FIVE. Strategic Interaction
  • CHAPTER SIX. Conclusion
  • APPENDIX 1. The Size of Groups
  • APPENDIX 2. Table of Symbols
  • APPENDIX 3. Table of Equations
  • Index