Wittgenstein's account of truth /

Annotation

التفاصيل البيبلوغرافية
المؤلف الرئيسي: Ellenbogen, Sara
التنسيق: Licensed eBooks
اللغة:الإنجليزية
منشور في: Albany : State University of New York Press, ©2003.
سلاسل:SUNY series in philosophy.
الوصول للمادة أونلاين:https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=112119
جدول المحتويات:
  • Machine generated contents note: pt. I From "Meaning Is Use" to the Rejection of Transcendent Truth
  • 1. Wittgenstein's Rejection of Realism versus Semantic Antirealism
  • 2. Positive Account of Truth
  • 3. Antirealism Revisited
  • pt. II From "Meaning Is Use" To Semantic Antirealism
  • 4. Acquisition Argument and the Manifestation Criterion
  • 5. Antirealism Presupposes Realism
  • 6. Tensions Between Wittgenstein and Dummett
  • 7. Semantic Antirealism Is Inconsistent
  • pt. III Why A Revisionist Account Of Truth?
  • 8. Criteria and Justification Conditions
  • 9. Criteria and Realist Truth Conditions
  • 10. Why Criteria Are Not Defeasible
  • 11. Criterial Change, Conceptual Change, and Their Implications for the Concept of Truth
  • 12. Why a Revisionist Account of Truth?

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