Political leadership and collective goods /

Using the assumptions of rationality and self-interest common to economic analysis, Professors Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and Young develop a profit-making theory of political behavior as it pertains to the supply of collective goods-defense, law and order, clean air, highways.Originally published in 19...

Mô tả đầy đủ

Chi tiết về thư mục
Những tác giả chính:	Frohlich, Norman (Tác giả), Oppenheimer, Joe A. (Tác giả), Young, Oran R. (Tác giả)
Định dạng:	Licensed eBooks
Ngôn ngữ:	Tiếng Anh
Được phát hành:	Princeton, New Jersey : Princeton University Press 1971.
Loạt:	Princeton legacy library.
Truy cập trực tuyến:	https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/j.ctt13x19bj

Mục lục:

Frontmatter
Foreword
Preface
Contents
Introduction
CHAPTER ONE. Noncompetitive Politics
CHAPTER TWO. The Consequences of Noncompetitive Politics
CHAPTER THREE. Competitive Politics
CHAPTER FOUR. Some Consequences of Political Competition
CHAPTER FIVE. Strategic Interaction
CHAPTER SIX. Conclusion
APPENDIX 1. The Size of Groups
APPENDIX 2. Table of Symbols
APPENDIX 3. Table of Equations
Index

Political leadership and collective goods /

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