Semantic challenges to realism : Dummett and Putnam /
Although many philosophers espouse anti-realism, the only sustained arguments for the position are due to Michael Dummett and Hilary Putnam. Gardiner's unpretentious style and lucid organization make sense of Dummett's and Putnam's discourse.
| Hlavní autor: | |
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| Médium: | Licensed eBooks |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Vydáno: |
Toronto, Ont. :
University of Toronto Press
©2000.
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| Edice: | Toronto studies in philosophy.
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| On-line přístup: | https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.3138/9781442679740 |
Obsah:
- PREFACE
- INTRODUCTION
- PART I: DUMMETT'S SEMANTIC ANTI-REALISM
- 1 Dummett's Constraints
- Meaning and Metaphysics
- 2 Dummett's Critique of Semantic Realism
- The Acquisition Argument
- The Manifestation Argument
- 3 Responses to the Negative Program
- Decidability
- Are There Any Undecidable Sentences?
- Other Sources of Undecidability?
- 4 Responses to the Positive Program
- Does an Anti-Realist Semantics Harmonize with the Constraints on Understanding?
- Realist Routes to Manifestation
- The Naivety of Both Realist and Anti-Realist Semantics.
- PART II: PUTNAM'S INTERNAL REALISM
- 5 Portraits: Metaphysical and Internal Realisms
- 6 The Model-Theoretic Argument
- Against the ""Just More Theory"" Ploy
- Against the Very Idea of an Epistemically Ideal Theory
- 7 Brains in Vats
- The Argument
- Responses to the Argument
- The Vat Argument and Realism
- 8 The Argument from Equivalence
- Against Verisimilitude
- Against the Existential Claim
- Empirical Equivalence and the Model-Theoretic Argument
- A Second Argument from Equivalence
- Conclusion
- NOTES
- BIBLIOGRAPHY
- INDEX
- A
- B
- C
- D
- E
- F
- G
- H
- I
- J.
- K
- L
- M
- N
- P
- Q
- R
- S
- T
- U
- V
- W
- Y.