The politics of deregulation /
The standard wisdom among political scientists has been that ""iron triangles"" operated among regulatory agencies, the regulated industries, and members of Congress, all presumably with a stake in preserving regulation that protected the industries from competition. Despite almo...
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| フォーマット: | Licensed eBooks |
| 言語: | 英語 |
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Washington, D.C. :
Brookings Institution
©1985.
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| オンライン･アクセス: | https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7864/jj.11589163 |
目次:
- Cover
- Contents
- 1. Three Cases of Deregulation
- The History of Change
- The Critique of Regulation
- Why Did Deregulation Occur?
- Economic Theories of Deregulation
- The Case Studies and Analysis
- 2. The Reform Idea
- Presidents, Economists, and Regulatory Reform
- Deregulation as Analytic Prescription
- Deregulation as Policy Choice and Political Symbol
- Deregulation as Policy Fashion
- Conclusion
- 3. Why the Regulators Chose to Deregulate
- Commissions as a Governmental Form
- The Chairmen
- The Staffs
- Commission Members
- Conclusion
- 4. The Strength of the Reform Forces in Congress
- Reform Victories
- Leadership for Reform
- Reform Advocacy in Congress
- Conclusion
- 5. The Industries' Retreat
- Airlines and Trucking
- Telecommunications
- Conclusion
- 6. The Limits of Deregulation
- Natural Gas Pricing
- Air Pollution
- Davis-Bacon Act
- Milk Marketing
- The Maritime Industry
- 7. The Politics of Ideas
- The Explanation of Success
- The Role of Analysis
- The U.S. Political System
- Index
- A
- B
- C
- D
- F
- F
- G
- H
- I
- J
- K
- L
- M
- N
- O
- P
- Q
- R
- S
- T
- U
- V
- W