Limits of constraint : the originalist jurisprudence of Hugo Black, Antonin Scalia, and Clarence Thomas /
"Adherents of originalism often present it as a theory that constrains legal decisions in a clear and objective manner, based on the original text of the Constitution and the intentions of the Framers-in contrast to the supposedly subjective and 'activist' jurisprudence of those who p...
| Prif Awdur: | |
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| Fformat: | Licensed eBooks |
| Iaith: | Saesneg |
| Cyhoeddwyd: |
Lawrence, Kansas :
University Press of Kansas,
[2022]
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| Mynediad Ar-lein: | https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/j.ctv2sx9fwk |
| Crynodeb: | "Adherents of originalism often present it as a theory that constrains legal decisions in a clear and objective manner, based on the original text of the Constitution and the intentions of the Framers-in contrast to the supposedly subjective and 'activist' jurisprudence of those who promote a living Constitution. But originalists have not had the same views on constitutional issues, calling into question the theory of originalism. The Limits of Constraint examines the originalist jurisprudence of Hugo Black, Antonin Scalia, and Clarence Thomas, showing that the Court's three originalists have arrived at different conclusions in a large number of constitutional areas. While the starkest contrast is between Justice Black and Justices Scalia and Thomas, even the latter two justices have disagreed on a number of key issues, including executive power and the administrative state. James Staab shows that originalism in actual practice does not deliver on its promise of an objective jurisprudence free of bias and so-called judicial activism"-- |
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| Disgrifiad Corfforoll: | 1 online resource |
| Llyfryddiaeth: | Includes bibliographical references (pages 409-420) and indexes. |
| ISBN: | 9780700633319 0700633316 9780700633302 0700633308 |