Merleau-Ponty and Nancy on sense and being : at the limits of phenomenology /
Marie-Eve Morin proposes a reinterpretation of the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty and Nancy from the perspective of realist and object-oriented tendencies in contemporary philosophy. She shows how they avoid the danger, inherent in the phenomenological approach, of reducing being to sense.
| Tác giả chính: | |
|---|---|
| Định dạng: | Licensed eBooks |
| Ngôn ngữ: | Tiếng Anh |
| Được phát hành: |
Edinburgh :
Edinburgh University Press,
[2022]
|
| Loạt: | New perspectives in ontology.
|
| Truy cập trực tuyến: | https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.3366/j.ctv2rcnpm9 |
Mục lục:
- Introduction: The speculative realist challenge and the limits of phenomenology
- Part I
- Body
- Merleau-Ponty, Descartes and the unreflected life of the body
- Nancy, Descartes, the exposition of bodies and the extension of the soul
- Divergences : unity versus dislocation
- Part II
- Thing
- Things in the Phenomenology of perception : the paradox of an in-itself-for-us
- Things after the Phenomenology : Merleau-Ponty's cautious anthropomorphism
- Nancy's materialism and the stone
- Part III
- Being
- Merleau-Ponty's and Nancy's engagement with Heidegger
- Two ontologies of sense.