Wittgenstein's critique of Russell's multiple relation theory of judgement :

This book sets out to adjudicate the scholarly controversy surrounding Wittgenstein's May-June 1913 critique of Russell's multiple-relation theory of judgement. It also aims to familiarize readers with the historical events, textual evidence, letters, working notes and diagrams which are c...

Πλήρης περιγραφή

Λεπτομέρειες βιβλιογραφικής εγγραφής
Κύριος συγγραφέας: Connelly, James R. (Συγγραφέας)
Μορφή: Licensed eBooks
Γλώσσα:Αγγλικά
Έκδοση: London : Anthem Press, 2021.
Σειρά:Anthem studies in Wittgenstein.
Διαθέσιμο Online:https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/j.ctv1j2cx4h
Πίνακας περιεχομένων:
  • Cover
  • Half Title
  • Series Information
  • Title Page
  • Copyright Page
  • Dedication
  • Epigrapgh
  • Contents
  • List of Figures
  • Acknowledgements
  • List of Common Abbreviations
  • Introduction
  • Chapter 1 Historical and Philosophical Background
  • 1.1 Neo-Hegelian Origins
  • 1.2 Russellian Propositions
  • 1.3 Why Did Russell Abandon Russellian Propositions?
  • 1.4 The Multiple Relation Theory
  • 1.5 Wittgenstein at Cambridge
  • 1.6 The Theory of Knowledge Manuscript
  • Chapter 2 The Scholarly Controversy
  • 2.1 The Direction Problems
  • 2.2 The Standard Reading
  • 2.3 Stevens's First Critique of EI: Direct Inspection and the MRTJ
  • 2.4 Stevens's Second Critique of EI: The Logical Status of the Subordinate Relation
  • 2.5 The Ontological Interpretation
  • 2.6 Hanks's Critique of the Standard Reading
  • 2.7 Hanks on How Wittgenstein 'Defeated' the MRTJ
  • 2.8 Pincock on the Standard Reading
  • 2.9 Pincock on Hanks and the Unity of Judgement
  • 2.10 The Correspondence Problem
  • 2.11 Landini and Giaretta on Type* Distinctions
  • 2.12 Landini on Wittgenstein's Critique of the MRTJ
  • 2.13 Lebens on the 'Representation Concern' and the Stoutian Evolution of the MRTJ
  • 2.14 Lebens on the Demise of the MRTJ
  • Chapter 3 Russell's Paralysis
  • 3.1 The Logical Interpretation
  • 3.2 Revising the Standard Reading
  • 3.3 Re-examining Stevens on EI and OI
  • 3.4 Hanks on the Judging Relation and Wittgenstein's Critique of the MRTJ
  • 3.5 Pincock on the Proposition Problem
  • 3.6 Pincock on the Correspondence Problem
  • 3.7 Russell's Diagram of Understanding
  • 3.8 'Props'
  • 3.9 Type* Distinctions Reappraised
  • 3.10 Revisiting Landini on Wittgenstein's Critique of the MRTJ
  • 3.11 Reconsidering the Representation Concern
  • 3.12 The Demise of TK and of the MRTJ
  • Chapter 4 Wittgenstein on Truth, Logic and Representation
  • 4.1 The Picture Theory of Propositions
  • 4.2 Wittgenstein and Type-Theory
  • 4.3 Logical Form
  • 4.4 Bipolarity and Extensionalism
  • 4.5 Saying and Showing
  • 4.6 Inference
  • 4.7 Sense-Truth Regress
  • 4.8 The Fundamental Thought (Grundgedanke)
  • 4.9 The General Propositional Form
  • 4.10 Transition
  • 4.11 The Later View: Continuities amidst Contrasts
  • 4.12 Conclusion
  • References
  • Works by Russell
  • Works by Wittgenstein
  • Works by Other Authors
  • Index