Rule-following and realism /
Through detailed and trenchant criticism of standard interpretations of some of the key arguments in analytical philosophy over the last sixty years, this book arrives at a new conception of the proper starting point and task of the philosophy of language. To understand central topics in the philoso...
| Tác giả chính: | |
|---|---|
| Định dạng: | Licensed eBooks |
| Ngôn ngữ: | Tiếng Anh |
| Được phát hành: |
Cambridge, Mass. :
Harvard University Press,
1997.
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| Truy cập trực tuyến: | https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=281898 |
Mục lục:
- CONTENTS
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- Part I. Rule-Following
- Chapter One. Kripke�s Skepticism about Meaning
- Chapter Two. Quine�s Scientific Skepticism about Meaning
- Chapter Three. The Very Idea of a Participant Perspective
- Part II. The Analytic-Synthetic Distinction
- Chapter Four. Carnap�s Analytic-Synthetic Distinction
- Chapter Five. Quine�s Reasons for Rejecting Carnap�s Analytic-Synthetic Distinction
- Chapter Six. Putnam�s Reasons for Rejecting Carnap�s Analytic-Synthetic Distinction
- Part III. Anti-Individualism
- Chapter Seven. From the Rejection of the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction to Anti-Individualism Chapter Eight. Participation, Deference, and Dialectic
- Chapter Nine. Realism, Self-Knowledge, and Skepticism
- Notes
- Index