Democratic constitutional design and public policy : analysis and evidence /
Leading scholars in rational choice analysis present the public choice, new institutionalist, and new political economy perspectives on the political and economic effects of constitutional design and review the accumulating empirical evidence.
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| Autres auteurs: | , |
| Format: | Licensed eBooks |
| Langue: | anglais |
| Publié: |
Cambridge, Mass. :
MIT Press,
©2006.
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| Accès en ligne: | https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=156941 |
Table des matières:
- Introduction : rational choice politics and institutions / Roger D. Congleton and Birgitta Swedenborg
- Direct democracy : designing a living constitution / Bruno S. Frey and Alois Stutzer
- Constitutions and economic policy / Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini
- Party-line voting and committee assignments in the German mixed-member system / Thomas Stratmann
- The effects of constitutions on coalition governments in parliamentary democracies / Daniel Diermeier, Hülya Eraslan, and Antonio Merlo
- On the merits of bicameral legislatures : intragovernmental bargaining and policy stability / Roger D. Congleton
- Bicameralism and political compromise in representative democracy / John Charles Bradbury and W. Mark Crain
- Federalism : a constitutional perspective / Dennis C. Mueller
- Common tax pool problems in federal systems / Brian Knight
- Judicial independence and economic Growth : some proposals regarding the judiciary / Lars P. Feld and Stefan Voigt
- Constitutions and prosperity : the impact of legal and economic institutions on the wealth of nations / Randall G. Holcombe, Robert A. Lawson, and James D. Gwartney
- Amendment procedures and constitutional stability / Bjørn Erik Rasch and Roger D. Congleton
- Designing constitutional stability / Barry R. Weingast.