Elbridge Gerry's salamander : the electoral consequences of the reapportionment revolution /
The Supreme Court's reapportionment decisions, beginning with Baker v. Carr in 1962, had far more than jurisprudential consequences. They sparked a massive wave of extraordinary redistricting in the mid-1960s. Both state legislative and congressional districts were redrawn more comprehensively-...
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| フォーマット: | Licensed eBooks |
| 言語: | 英語 |
| 出版事項: |
Cambridge ; New York :
Cambridge University Press,
2002.
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| シリーズ: | Political economy of institutions and decisions.
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| オンライン･アクセス: | https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=112603 |
目次:
- pt. I. Introduction. 1. Introduction. 2. The Reapportionment Revolution
- pt. II. Democrats and Republicans. 3. A Model of Congressional Redistricting in the United States. 4. The Case of the Disappearing Bias. 5. The Role of the Courts in the 1960s Redistricting Process. 6. Bias, Responsiveness, and the Courts. 7. Redistricting's Differing Impact on Democratic and Republican Incumbents
- pt. III. Incumbents and Challengers. 8. The Growth of the Incumbency Advantage. 9. Candidate Entry Decisions and the Incumbency Advantage. 10. Redistricting and Electoral Coordination. 11. Redistricting, the Probability of Securing a Majority, and Entry. 12. Reassessing the Incumbency Advantage
- pt. IV. Conclusion. 13. Final Thoughts.