Wittgenstein's account of truth /
Annotation
| Tác giả chính: | |
|---|---|
| Định dạng: | Licensed eBooks |
| Ngôn ngữ: | Tiếng Anh |
| Được phát hành: |
Albany :
State University of New York Press,
©2003.
|
| Loạt: | SUNY series in philosophy.
|
| Truy cập trực tuyến: | https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=112119 |
Mục lục:
- Machine generated contents note: pt. I From "Meaning Is Use" to the Rejection of Transcendent Truth
- 1. Wittgenstein's Rejection of Realism versus Semantic Antirealism
- 2. Positive Account of Truth
- 3. Antirealism Revisited
- pt. II From "Meaning Is Use" To Semantic Antirealism
- 4. Acquisition Argument and the Manifestation Criterion
- 5. Antirealism Presupposes Realism
- 6. Tensions Between Wittgenstein and Dummett
- 7. Semantic Antirealism Is Inconsistent
- pt. III Why A Revisionist Account Of Truth?
- 8. Criteria and Justification Conditions
- 9. Criteria and Realist Truth Conditions
- 10. Why Criteria Are Not Defeasible
- 11. Criterial Change, Conceptual Change, and Their Implications for the Concept of Truth
- 12. Why a Revisionist Account of Truth?